Two Dogmas of Analytical Philosophy

In his landmark article, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” W.V.O. Quine pushed analytical philosophy into its post-positivist phase by rejecting two central tenets of logical empiricism. The first dogma was the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements; the second was reductionism, or the belief that to each synthetic sentence there corresponds a set of experiences that will confirm or disconfirm it. But in both “Two Dogmas” and Word and Object, Quine stretches analytical philosophy to its limits. The problem is, ironically, his adherence to two separate dogmas. The first stems from Quine’s empiricism: he insists that there is nothing more to meaning than the empirical method of discovering it. The second has been taken as the defining characteristic of analytical philosophy;2 it is the belief that a philosophical account of thought can only be attained through an account of language – the famed “linguistic turn.” I will argue that a philosophical account of language can only be attained given an account of thought,3 and that the philosophies of Kant and Davidson can help us construct such an account

Two English Hearsay Heresies

China - Yenan [Yan'an], Fertilizer plantColorVolume 59, Page

High Resolution Observations of GRB 030329

The nearby (z=0.1685) gamma-ray burst of 29 March 2003 has presented us with a unique opportunity to study an event with unprecedented physical resolution. This burst reached flux density levels at centimeter wavelengths more than 50 times brighter than any previously studied event. Here we present the results of VLBI observations that have resolved the radio afterglow, and constrain its proper motion in the sky to <0.3 mas. The size of the afterglow is measured to be ~0.08 mas 24 days after the burst, consistent with expectations of the standard fireball model. In observations taken 51 days after the burst we detect an additional compact, "jet", component at a distance from the main component of 0.28 ± 0.05 mas. The presence of this jet component is not consistent with the standard model

Claim Models: Granular Forms and Machine Learning Forms

This collection of articles addresses the most modern forms of loss reserving methodology: granular models and machine learning models. New methodologies come with questions about their applicability. These questions are discussed in one article, which focuses on the relative merits of granular and machine learning models. Others illustrate applications with real-world data. The examples include neural networks, which, though well known in some disciplines, have previously been limited in the actuarial literature. This volume expands on that literature, with specific attention to their application to loss reserving. For example, one of the articles introduces the application of neural networks of the gated recurrent unit form to the actuarial literature, whereas another uses a penalized neural network. Neural networks are not the only form of machine learning, and two other papers outline applications of gradient boosting and regression trees respectively. Both articles construct loss reserves at the individual claim level so that these models resemble granular models. One of these articles provides a practical application of the model to claim watching, the action of monitoring claim development and anticipating major features. Such watching can be used as an early warning system or for other administrative purposes. Overall, this volume is an extremely useful addition to the libraries of those working at the loss reserving frontier

Structured Problem-Solving: Against the 'Step-by-Step' Method

Recently a German professor has advocated the adoption in this country of the German style of legal problem solving. Occasionally a German author attempts to civilise the common-law world using what is put forward as a more rational approach. But with such endeavours is usually associated a certain lack of self-critical reflection. In this instance an Australian author is able to draw on his studies in Germany to rectify the omission. He shows that the problem-solving method in question conveys a false picture of the nature of legal problem solving and of the law itself, while not possessing the advantages claimed for it

Parliament's Power to Require the Production of Documents - a Recent Victorian Case

In 2007, the Victorian government refused to produce a series of documents despite an order by the State’s Legislative Council to do so, claiming that the Council’s legal powers did not extend to making the order in question. The government cited some obscure alleged rules of law in support of theirposition which no government elsewhere in Australia has ever thought to rely on. In citing these rules, the Victorian government appears to have misunderstood an early edition of Erskine May. This article demonstrates that none of the alleged rules exists, and the government’s refusal was wrong in law. Therefore is should not be regarded as setting a precedent forfuture cases